Bryant University

Bryant Digital Repository
Accounting Journal Articles

Accounting Faculty Publications and Research

12-2019

Modeling Market Reactions to Auditor Changes Using Variable
Selection Algorithms: A Meta-Analysis
Richard HOLOWCZAK
CUNY Bernard M Baruch College

David A. Louton
Bryant University, dlouton@bryant.edu

Hakan Saraoglu
saraoglu@bryant.edu

Charles Cullinan
Bryant University, cullinan@bryant.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/acc_jou
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
HOLOWCZAK, Richard; Louton, David A.; Saraoglu, Hakan; and Cullinan, Charles, "Modeling
Market Reactions to Auditor Changes Using Variable Selection Algorithms: A Meta-Analysis"
(2019). Accounting Journal Articles. Paper 157.
https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/acc_jou/157
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting Faculty Publications and Research at
Bryant Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Journal Articles by an authorized
administrator of Bryant Digital Repository. For more information, please contact dcommons@bryant.edu.

Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati
Fascicle I. Economics and Applied Informatics
Years XXV – no3/2019
ISSN-L 1584-0409
ISSN-Online 2344-441X
www.eia.feaa.ugal.ro

DOI https://doi.org/10.35219/eai1584040949

Modeling Market Reactions to Auditor Changes Using
Variable Selection Algorithms: A Meta-Analysis
Richard HOLOWCZAK , David LOUTON, Hakan SARAOGLU, Charles P. CULLINAN
A R T I C L E

I N F O

Article history:
Accepted December 2019
Available online December 2019
JEL Classification
C10, G11
Keywords:
Control variables, Cumulative
abnormal returns, OLS Post-LASSO,
Variables selection

A B S T R A C T

Market reactions to auditor change filings have been studied over a long period in the
literature. We provide a review of the literature on market response to auditor changes and
identify a superset of variables used in published research. Applying methods from
machine learning to optimize variable selection, we build models that explain market
reaction to auditor changes. We compare the performance of our models with the
performance of the models that use subsets of variables examined in a select list of studies
in the literature. Our meta-analysis results in an improvement in model fit compared to the
analysis used in prior studies.
© 2019 EAI. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Publicly-traded companies in the US are required to notify the investing public whenever an auditor
change occurs. The SEC considers an auditor change to be a particularly important type of event, requiring
timely and separate disclosure of these types of events (SEC 2017). The accounting literature has considered
market reactions to auditor change notifications (through cumulative abnormal returns on the company’s
stock) in the period around the time of the filing (e.g., Blau et al. 2013; Cullinan et al. 2012; Chang et al. 2010;
Knechell et al. 2007).
In most studies of the market reaction to auditor change, there is a specific variable (or set of
variables) that are of particular interest to the authors. The authors then add control variables to ensure their
findings are robust, and not related to other factors that may be correlated with their variables of interest.
The inclusion of control variables has often been ad-hoc, without clear empirical grounding. This approach
could make the results susceptible to change or misinterpretation if different control variables are considered
or not included in the regression models.
Given the recent improvement in the availability of data in many fields, researchers have been
increasingly using methods that involve data-driven inference in which they start with high dimensional data
with many variables and shrink the data to a small number of variables that can enter their model through
variable selection methods. Studies in the scientific literature show the advantage of incorporating variables
selection processes into meta-analyses, which summarize and synthesize evidence from multiple studies, in
order to improve model interpretation and prediction (Liu, et al., 2010; Li, et al., 2014; He, et al., 2016). For
example, recent advances in biotechnology have led to the generation of many high-dimensional gene
expression data sets that can be used to address similar biological questions. Meta-analysis plays an
important role in summarizing and synthesizing scientific evidence from multiple studies.
When the dimensions of datasets are high, it is desirable to incorporate variable selection into metaanalyses to improve model interpretation and prediction. Belloni, et al. (2014) present an overview of
methods that can be used in the estimation of structural models to provide high-quality inferences about
model parameters. Variable selection has been increasingly applied to studies in finance and economics.
Motivated by the need to find practical tools for applied econometricians to estimate demand with large
numbers of variables, Bajari, et al. (2015) survey machine-learning methods and apply them to the problem
of demand estimation. They propose a method of combining the surveyed models via linear regression. They
show that their approach is robust to many regressors and combines model selection and estimation. In more
recent work, Feng et al. (2017), Freyberger et al. (2018), and Han et al. (2018), and Rapach et al. (2018) use
machine learning methods to deal with high-dimensional data in finance. Machine learning methods for
variable selection have gained increasing attention among researchers and have been proposed as
alternatives to stepwise selection methods, which has several shortcomings. Specifically, concerns with
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stepwise methods include (1) the coefficient values are biased upward, (2) the standard errors of model
coefficients are biased downward, (3) the p-values are biased downward, (4) the results are sensitive to the
number of predictive variables, and (5) the R-squared values are biased upward (Derksen, et al.; 1992;
Harrell, 2001).
We contribute to the accounting and finance research through a review of the literature for market
response to auditor changes and by developing a meta-analysis based variable selection process. We then use
this process to build a model that improves the power of tests to explain market reaction to auditor changes.
We introduce the OLS post-LASSO method for model development into the auditor change literature. This
method may prove useful to future researchers by providing a more rigorous test of the significance of
whatever variables are of particular interest in their research.
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2. Methods
2.1 Creating a union set of variables from previous literature
We construct a superset of variables associated with the market reaction to auditor changes by
considering extant research studies on this topic. We begin with the auditor change literature review of
Stefaniak et al. (2009), supplemented with searching through research indices, such as Google Scholar. (Our
focus in this literature search is on empirical papers and models, so we do not include Teoh’s (1992)
analytical modeling paper in our existing empirical studies table (Table 1) related to market reactions to
auditor changes). The list of variables associated with market reaction to auditor change announcements
found in the literature is documented on Table 1. The columns in the table are arranged chronologically
(most recent first) by date of publication, while the variables shown in the rows are presented in the order of
most common use. There are a total of 29 variables used in the existing literature, with variables measuring
movement between Big N and non-Big N being the most commonly used. These variables are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1
Union of Variables from Extant Literature
X indicates the variable is used in the study. Significant variables in the individual published studies are
indicated in bold and underlined.
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2.1.1 Variables excluded from our analyses
In applying the variables selection methods, we do not include some of the variables used to model
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with auditor change announcements. We omit certain
variables from our analyses for two reasons: multiple related variables that represent linear combinations
and older variables that are no longer relevant.
Multiple related variables: Some variables considered in previous research represent a
combination of variables already included in our models. For example, we do not include a variable for lateral
shifts among CPA firm tiers. We do include upward (e.g., from smaller firms to Big 4) and downward shifts
(e.g., from Big 4 to smaller firms). Inclusion of the lateral shift category would have resulted in a linear
combination of variables, violating an assumption of regression. We therefore exclude lateral changes. The
coefficient on the upward and downward shift variables thus measures the effect of an upward or downward
auditor change relative to lateral changes.
Relevance of older variables in the current disclosure environment: Three variables measure
constructs that are no longer relevant in the current regulatory structure. First, Eichenseher et al. (1989)
include a variable measuring whether the company changing auditors had an audit committee. The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (§ 301) mandates that “The audit committee of each issuer … shall be directly responsible
for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm
employed by that issuer.” Audit committees therefore always have the responsibility for managing the
auditor relationship throughout most of our sample period. Second, Wells and Louder (1997) include a
variable for whether the auditor change was disclosed in an 8-K filing. Since at least 2004, registrants are
required to file an 8-K to notify investors of a change in their auditors (SEC, 2004). This variable is therefore
also no longer relevant in the current environment. Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2004) and Wells and
Louder (1997) include three measures related to the disclosure of various reasons for auditor change. Since
the time period of the data used in these previous studies, there is more consistent disclosure related to
auditor changes. We therefore rely on the more recent “reason” variables developed and used in the models
of Hennes (2013) and Hossain et al. (2014).
2.1.2 Variables adapted from the list from the previous literature
We adapt some variables in the existing literature based on a more current institutional
environment. The upward change variable, which has various measures from Big 8 v. non-Big 8 (e.g., Nicholas
and Smith 1982), to Big 4, Second 2 (BDO and Grant Thornton) and other firms (Chang et al. 2010), to Big 4,
Next 4, and Smaller firms (Cullinan et al. 2012) to Big 4/5/6 v. non-Big 4/5/6 (Hennes 2014). We adopt the
three-tier structure used by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (US GAO, 2008). These three tiers
consist of the Big 4 (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KMPG), mid-sized firms (BDO,
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Grant Thornton, RSM/McGladrey and Crowe Chizek), and small firms. Upward shifts are measured as 1 if the
client moved from a small firm to a mid-sized firm, or from a mid-sized to a Big 4 firm. Upward shift is
measured as 2 if the client moved from a small firm to a Big 4. Downward shifts are measured similarly, but in
reverse. Upward and downward shifts are both measured as 0 if the client’s predecessor and successor
auditor were both in the same tier.
There are two variables for which we develop two measures each. First, return on assets (ROA) was
measured by Hossain et al. (2014) based on income before interest and taxes. We use Hossain’s measure as
well as the more traditional finance measure of ROA in which income is based on earnings before
extraordinary items. Second, most of the extant literature measures size based on assets (i.e., an accounting
measure of size). Finance literature suggests that the market reactions to other events may depend on the
market capitalization (e.g., Ikenberry et el. 1995), not just size as measured by the financial statements. We
therefore include both total assets and total market capitalization among the variables in our model
development. The set of variables used for our model development, and their measurement is presented in
Table 2.
Table 2
Variables used for model building
Variable
Variable description
Variable name
Definition/measurement
1 if moving up one CPA firm tier; 2 if
Upward shift
V_UPWARD_SHIFT
moving up two tiers (i.e., from small
firm to Big 4), 0 otherwise
1 if moving down one CPA firm tier;
Downward shift
V_DOWNWARD_SHIFT
2 if moving up two tiers (i.e., from
Big 4 to small firm), 0 otherwise
1 if predecessor auditor was cityIndustry specialist
V_INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST
level specialist, 0 otherwise
1 if auditor resigned, 0 otherwise
Resign
AUDITOR_RESIGNED
Fourth Quarter

V_FOURTH_QUARTER

Client size (Assets)

V_CLIENT_SIZE_ASSETS

Client Size (Market Value)

V_CLIENT_SIZE_MARKET_VALUE

Disagreement between auditor
and client
Client distress

AUD_CO_DISAGREE
V_ALTMAN_Z_SCORE

Fee/fee change

V_FEE_CHANGE

Managerial ownership

V_MANAGERIAL_OWNERSHIP_F
S

Auditor tenure

V_AUDITOR_TENURE

Accruals quality

V_DISC_AQ

Going concern opinion

DISMISSED_GC

IC weakness/IC reportable event

ISS_IC_REPORTABLE

Restatement

ISS_RESTATE_FINS

Accelerated filer

IS_ACCEL_FILER

Reason (Red flag)

V_REASON_RED_FLAG

Reason (non-red flag)

V_REASON_NON_RED_FLAG

Reportable event (f/s Reliability)

ISS_ACCOUNTING
8

1 if auditor change occurred in 4th
quarter of fiscal year, 0 otherwise
Total assets preceding auditor
change
Total market value preceding
auditor change
1 = Auditor/client disagreement, 0
otherwise
Altman Z score
Audit fee change from predecessor
to successor auditor
Percentage of shares held by
management and directors
Length of relationship between
predecessor auditor and client
Discretionary accruals in period
preceding auditor change
1 if going concern opinion issued by
predecessor auditor
1 if internal control reportable
event, 0 otherwise
1 if restatement in period preceding
auditor change
1 if accelerated filer, 0 otherwise
1 if reason for dismissal is red flag
(Going concern opinion,
restatement, SEC investigation), 0
otherwise
1 if reason provided for dismissal
other than red flag reason, 0
otherwise
1 if reason for dismissal is an
accounting issue or restatement, 0

Variable description
Growth

Variable name

Variable
Definition/measurement
otherwise
Percentage change in total assets

V_GROWTH

ROA

V_RETURN_ON_ASSETS

H-ROA

V_HOSSAIN_RETURN_ON_ASSET
S

Free cash flow

V_FREE_CASH_FLOW

Return on Assets in period
preceding auditor change. Income
measured as income before
extraordinary items.
Return on Assets in period
preceding auditor change. Income
measured as income before interest
and taxes.
Free cash flow in period preceding
auditor change

2.2 Data gathering process
We obtain data from Audit Analytics’ auditor change database for all auditor changes from January 7,
2001 to May 1, 2018. The number of auditor changes among publicly-traded companies with GVKEYs (for
matching to other databases) was 6,942. We then match these observations to CRSP (for measure of
cumulative abnormal returns), Compustat (for many of the model variables related to client financial issues),
other Audit Analytics Databases (for model variables related to the auditor and audit/client relationship) and
to Factset (for measurement of managerial ownership). We also remove auditor changes in which Arthur
Andersen was the previous auditor (In common with other auditor change literature (Knechell et al. 2007),
we exclude changes in which Arthur Andersen was the former auditor, as these changes were likely due to
the collapse of Andersen in 2002). Based on the data restrictions, our analyses are based on 1,133 auditor
change observations.
Our analysis consists of three main processes. First, we test models developed in other research
using our data. In effect, this is a replication of the other research models using a different data set. Second,
we implement the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) post-LASSO method proposed by Belloni and
Chernozhukov (2013). This method involves running a LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator)
analysis with cross validation for variable selection from the union of variables obtained from prior studies
and using the selected variables as regressors in an OLS model.
2.3 Models from previous literature used for basic OLS comparison
We develop models in which the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
associated with the auditor change. When comparing our models to the previous literature, we considered a
limited group of previous studies. Beginning with the total list of studies, we make exclusions from the
existing studies for model comparison for three main reasons: (1) there was no model presented in the
previous literature, (2) there were material restrictions on the samples used in the previous studies, and (3)
the data was from earlier periods and thus were not comparable to data used in our study.
There were a number of studies that categorized observations based on some characteristics of
interest and compared the CARs between/among the categories, but did not present regression models. For
example, Hennes et al. (2013) considered whether the market reaction was stronger for auditor resignation
relative to auditor dismissals, but did not use a regression model to explain variation among the CARs. Weiss
and Kalbers (2008) also considered particular characteristics of the auditor change, including whether the
client was an accelerated filer and whether the client moved to an auditor in a different tier (e.g., from Big 4 to
smaller firm) and also did not present a regression model.
Other extant papers focused on particular issues, and their samples were therefore restricted to
certain types of auditor changes. For example, Knechell, et al. (2007) considered only auditor changes
associated with an industry audit specialist. Hennes et al. (2013) considered only auditor changes following
restatements. Because our sample is more comprehensive, our models are not directly comparable to these
models based on purposefully-limited samples.
Finally, some published papers contained models based on data that is materially older than our
data. This data often was from periods before there was standardized disclosure of auditor changes. These
older studies include: Wells and Louder 1997; Klock 1994; Eichenseher et al. 1989; and Nichols and Smith
1982 (the years of data considered in these older studies ranged from 1972 to 1991). These older studies also
had much smaller sample sizes (ranging in size from 50 to 87 observations). The nature of these small
samples was not meaningfully comparable to our larger and more recent observations.
Based on these model exclusions, we run OLS regressions using the main variables from the studies
of Hossain et al. (2014), Cullinan et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2010), and Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant
(2004). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns around the auditor change filing date with an event
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window of [-3,3], employing the market model with a 180-day estimation period, at least 130 days of returns
and a 16-day gap. The results from these basic OLS regression models are presented in Table 3. The Rsquared values are very low, ranging from 0.003 to 0.010. The low explanatory power of these models
suggests that there may be value in using other methods, such as OLS post-LASSO to select variables to
develop models with more explanatory power.
Table 3
OLS Regressions using models from Prior Studies in the Literature
We run OLS regressions of the following form using the variables that each designated study included in its
analysis.

Intercept
V_UPWARD_SHIFT
V_DOWNWARD_SHIFT
V_INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST
AUDITOR_RESIGNED
V_FOURTH_QUARTER
V_CLIENT_SIZE_ASSETS

Using variables from the models of:
Whisenant, et
Chang, et al
Cullinan, et al.
Hossain, et al.
al. (2004)
(2010)
(2012)
(2014)
-0.0009
-0.0184
-0.0023
-0.0066
(-0.248)
(-1.507)
(-0.326)
(-0.797)
0.0159**
0.0111*
(2.293)
(2.293)
-0.0056
-0.0077
(-0.566)
(-0.566)
0.0024
(0.348)
0.0034
0.0046
(0.448)
(0.601)
0.0084
(0.348)
0.0022
0.0004
(1.154)
(0.272)

V_CLIENT_SIZE_MARKET_VALUE
AUD_CO_DISAGREE

-0.0151
(-0.564)

V_ALTMAN_Z_SCORE
0.2894
(0.858)

V_FEE_CHANGE

-0.0256
(1.154)
4.7648
(0.348)
0.0147
(0.858)

V_MANAGERIAL_OWNERSHIP_FS
V_AUDITOR_TENURE
V_DISC_AQ
-0.0013
(-0.100)
-0.0134
(-1.639)
-0.0049
(-0.324)

DISMISSED_GC
ISS_IC_REPORTABLE

-0.0093
(-1.162)

ISS_RESTATE_FINS

-0.0090
(-1.108)

V_RESTATEMENT_SIZE
-0.0074
(-0.100)

IS_ACCEL_FILER

-0.0052
(-0.493)
-0.0014
(-0.493)

V_REASON_RED_FLAG
V_REASON_NON_RED_FLAG
ISS_ACCOUNTING

-0.0020
(-0.110)
0.0037**
(2.172)
0.0153**

V_GROWTH
V_RETURN_ON_ASSETS
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Using variables from the models of:
Whisenant, et
Chang, et al
Cullinan, et al.
Hossain, et al.
al. (2004)
(2010)
(2012)
(2014)
(2.198)
V_HOSSAIN_RETURN_ON_ASSETS
V_FREE_CASH_FLOW
N
R-squared
F-statistic

1133
0.003
0.7286

1133
0.009
1.256

1133
0.008
1.357

-0.0092
(-0.938)
1133
0.010
1.683

2.4 OLS Post-LASSO Analysis
OLS post-LASSO is a two-step process. In the first step, the LASSO method is used to identify
variables that are appropriate to include in a regression analysis. LASSO proposed by Tibshirani (1996) is a
method for shrinkage and selection of variables to be used in OLS regression analyses. Given that the data are
denoted by
where
are the values of the independent variables and are the values of the dependent variable. N and p represent
the number of observations and the number of independent variables, respectively. If the predictor variables
are standardized such that:
(1)
the LASSO estimate is obtained by using the following formulation of an optimization problem:
(2)
where

is the L1 LASSO penalty and λ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter.
In our study, yi are the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and x represents the vector of

explanatory variables used in previous research studies in the literature, and β0, β0, …, βp are the coefficients
to be estimated by solving the above optimization problem. The minimization problem in equation (2)
represents a trade-off between obtaining coefficient estimates that fit the data well with the first term in the
square brackets and shrinking the magnitude of the coefficient estimates toward zero through the second
term, which represents a shrinkage penalty. The parameter λ strikes a balance between the two terms where
larger values of λ increase the shrinkage penalty and the regression produces coefficient estimates that are
closer to zero.
3. Results
Table 4 presents the variables selected using a λ value obtained through the LASSOCV analysis with
4-fold cross validation. In this process, 11 variables were selected, including some of the most common
variables, such as those measuring movement between tiers of auditors. Some less commonly used variables
were also machine-selected for inclusion, such as ROA and discretionary accruals, both of which are used in
only one of the 12 previous studies considered.
Table 4
Variable Selection Using LASSOCV
Using the variables selected by LASSOCV, we run an OLS model to examine the determinants of the market
response to auditor change filings. Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return represented by the
variable name, MMod_180_60_16_3_3.
Data are denoted by
where
are the values of the independent
variables and are the values of the dependent variable. N and p represent the number of observations and
the number of independent variables, respectively. If the predictor variables are standardized such that:
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the LASSO estimate is obtained by using the following formulation of an optimization problem:

where

is the L1 LASSO penalty and λ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter.
Intercept
V_UPWARD_SHIFT
V_DOWNWARD_SHIFT
V_FOURTH_QUARTER
V_CLIENT_SIZE_ASSETS
V_CLIENT_SIZE_MARKET_VALUE
AUD_CO_DISAGREE
V_FEE_CHANGE
ISS_IC_REPORTABLE
V_GROWTH
V_RETURN_ON_ASSETS
V_DISC_AQ
N
Minimum 
Maximum 
 Selected by Cross Validation

0.0
0.00350
-0.00094
0.00098
0.00997
-0.01321
-0.00033
0.00003
-0.00212
0.00463
0.00269
0.00632
1133
0.0000087
0.0087
0.0023

Table 5 present the OLS regression results obtained using the variables selected by the LASSO
method. The R-squared in this model (0.051) is materially higher than those presented in Table 3, in which
we used the variables selected by previous researchers. The explanatory power of this model is also higher
than many of the R-squareds reported by previous researchers when developing their models based on the
variables they selected and the individual datasets used in their research. This finding suggests that adoption
of the OLS post-LASSO method may more effectively control for other factors associated with market
reactions to auditor changes and thus may make findings associated with adding some variable of interest
more robust.
Table 5
Determinants of Market Response to Auditor Change Filings
Using the variables selected by LASSOCV, we run an OLS model to examine the determinants of the market
response to auditor change filings. Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return. We
calculate cumulative abnormal returns around the auditor change filing date with an event window of [-3,3],
employing the market model with a 180-day estimation period, at least 130 days of returns and a 16-day gap.
y = 0 +1V_UPWARD_SHIFT + 2V_DOWNWARD_SHIFT + 3 V_FOURTH_QUARTER + 4 V_CLIENT_SIZE_ASSETS
+ 5 V_CLIENT_SIZE_MARKET_VALUE +
+6 AUD_CO_DISAGREE + 7 V_FEE_CHANGE + 8 ISS_IC_REPORTABLE + 9 V_GROWTH + 10
V_RETURN_ON_ASSETS + 11 V_DISC_AQ + 
Coefficient
(t stat.)
-0.0150
(-1.202)
0.0123*
(1.797)
-0.0089
(-0.922)
0.0100
(1.390)
0.0185***
(5.222)
-0.0181***

Variable
Intercept
V_UPWARD_SHIFT
V_DOWNWARD_SHIFT
V_FOURTH_QUARTER
V_CLIENT_SIZE_ASSETS
V_CLIENT_SIZE_MARKET_VALUE
12

(-5.440)
-0.0175
(-0.786)
0.8124**
(2.410)
-0.0133*
(-1.716)
0.0043***
(2.565)
0.0084
(1.319)
0.0066***
(2.743)
1133
0.051
5.455

AUD_CO_DISAGREE
V_FEE_CHANGE
ISS_IC_REPORTABLE
V_GROWTH
V_RETURN_ON_ASSETS
V_DISC_AQ
Number of observations (N)
R-Squared
F statistic

4. Discussion
4.1 Discussion of results
The OLS pos-LASSO regression models presented in Table 5 demonstrate some interesting findings.
First, and consistent with the most commonly-examined issue in the auditor-change market-reaction
literature, the market reacts positively when clients select a new CPA firm from among firms of a larger size.
These results suggest that the market perceives that CPA firms of larger size may enhance the credibility of
client financial statements and/or that the willingness of a larger CPA firm to audit the client’s financial
statements may signal something positive about the client.
There are two size variables that are both highly significant in the models of auditor-change market
reactions with opposite signs: companies with more assets are more likely to have a positive market reaction,
while companies with a larger market capitalization are likely to have a smaller (percentage) market
reaction. These highly significant results suggest that it may be important for researchers to consider both
size variables in their model development.
The contrasting results for the two size variables (assets and market capitalization) indicate a more
complex relationship between size and market reactions. The assets size measure is based on the financial
statements, while the market value is based on the outstanding shares and price of the stock. We could
speculate that as the difference between these two size measures grows, this gap tends to signal that the
market perceives the company to be more of a growth stock (rather than a value stock). Growth stocks tend
to be more volatile, as the market has priced the expectation of rising sales and profits into the shares. Any
news about these growth stocks may be perceived as creating greater uncertainty, and thus may be
associated with a stronger negative market reaction (Ikenberry 1995).
The discretionary accruals variable is significant and positively related to market reactions to auditor
change announcements. Discretionary accruals are generally viewed as a measure of financial reporting
quality, with higher discretionary accruals signaling lower quality financial reporting. These results thus
suggest that the market perceives good news when a company with lower quality financial reporting changes
auditors.
The change in audit fee variable is significant and positive. Higher audit fees will reduce profits and
thus may be expected to result in a negative market response. However, higher audit fees could also signal
that the new auditor will perform more audit work, and thus potentially suggest closer monitoring by the
auditor (Tee et al. 2017) which can enhance the credibility of the audited financial statements. The positive
sign on the change in audit fee variable is thus more consistent with the auditor monitoring/financial
statement credibility idea.
4.2 Robustness analysis
An alternative variables selection model was also used for our analysis: ElasticNet Analysis (Zou and
Hastie 2005). The variable selection results were similar to those for LASSO process, except that the fee change
variable was not selected for inclusion by ElasticNet. The post-variables-selection regression results also yielded
similar results, except the internal control issue variable (ISS_IC_REPORTABLE) was not significant.
4.3 Limitations
The effective application of the LASSO requires data to be available for all of the potential variables of
interest. Due to varying availability of data, this approach may limit the generalizability of the first-stage
variables selection process. Second, these processes may be less useful in a sample that is significantly
restricted, such as the sample used by Hennes et al. (2013), whose main focus was on the effect of
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restatements, and whose sample was thereby restricted to auditor changes preceded by accounting
restatements.
5. Conclusions
The accounting literature has sought to explain the factors associated with the size of market
reactions to auditor change announcements since at least 1982. This literature has tended to focus on how an
auditor change may relate to the credibility of the financial reporting. Issues related to this credibility have
focused on the size of the auditor and whether the auditor is an industry specialist. Research has also
considered whether the reasons disclosed for the auditor change may help to explain variation in the size of
the market reaction to auditor change. The results of these studies are subject to variation and/or
misinterpretation if the model were to include different control variables.
Based on a union of the variables from previous studies, we identified 29 variables that have been
used to try to explain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with auditor change announcements.
We then create a new dataset incorporating 25 of these variables that are still relevant (and potentiallyindependent measures) related to auditor changes from 2001 to 2018. Using this dataset, we re-tested some
of the more recent and relevant models in the literature using traditional OLS regression techniques.
We then applied two-stage models in which the variables to be included in a regression models are
selected for inclusion at the initial stage based on their potential to measure unique underlying concepts. The
variable selections were based on the LASSO methods. The variables selected in the first stage were then used
to test OLS Regression models in which CAR was the dependent variable and the independent variables were
those selected by LASSO. The regression models with variable selection resulted in material improvement in
model fit relative to the models without machine-generated variables selection.
The variables selected by LASSO that were significant in the OLS regression models included some of
the more common variables in the literature, including the size of the predecessor and successor auditors,
which was used in 7 of the 12 papers considered.
Our study introduces the OLS Post-LASSO selection models into the auditor change literature. Our
results suggest that researchers may find it useful to adopt a more formal variable selection process in
modeling market reactions. The results would then provide a more robust test of their variable(s) of interest,
as other factors may be more effectively controlled.
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